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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of cooperatives on smallholder commercialization of cereals, using 
detailed household data from rural Ethiopia. We review the involvement of cooperatives, in terms of who 
participates and where they are located. We then use the strong government role in promoting the 
establishment of cooperatives to assume that the decision of where to establish a cooperative is largely 
driven by external considerations, and is thus exogenous to the members themselves justifying the use of 
propensity-score matching in order to compare households that are cooperative members to similar 
households in comparable areas without cooperatives. Four conclusions are derived from the analysis. 
First, despite the spread of cooperatives – they existed in less than 15 percent of districts in 1994 and 
nearly 35 percent in 2005 – there are important disparities across regions. Within regions, cooperatives 
tend to be located in areas that already have better access to markets and lower exposure to price and 
environmental risks. Second, at the household level participation is only 9 percent, with poorer 
households less likely to participate. Third, while cooperatives obtain higher prices for their members, 
they are not associated with a significant increase in the overall share of cereal production sold by their 
members. Fourth, these average results hide considerable heterogeneity in the impact across households. 
In particular, we find smaller farmers tend to reduce their marketable surplus as a result of higher prices, 
while the opposite is true for larger farmers. 
 
Keywords: Smallholders’ marketing, cooperatives, Ethiopia 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
It is increasingly recognized that the commercialization of surplus output from small-scale farming is 
closely linked to higher productivity, greater specialization, and higher income (see Timmer 1997). 
Furthermore, in a world of efficient markets, commercialization leads to the separation of households’ 
production decisions from their consumption decisions, supporting food diversity and overall stability. At 
the macro level, commercialization has also been shown to increase food security and, more generally, to 
improve allocative efficiency (Timmer 1997; Fafchamps 2005). 
  However, in the face of imperfect markets and high transaction costs, many smallholders are 
unable to exploit the potential gains from commercialization (de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; 
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry 2000). In the absence of mechanisms to overcome these constraints, 
smallholders are unlikely to participate in markets or, when they do, to realize the full benefits of 
participation. These challenges are particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where empirical 
evidence suggests that the proportion of farmers engaged in subsistence agriculture remains very high. At 
the same time, those who participate in markets often do so only at the margins because of the high risks 
and associated costs (Jayne, Zulu, and Nijhoff 2006). 
  During the past decade, donors and governments have regained interest in collective-action 
mechanisms to overcome smallholders’ marketing constraints (Collion and Rondot 1998; World Bank 
2003), although the empirical record suggests varying levels of success (for example Uphoff 1993; 
Tendler 1983; Sharma and Gulati 2003; Neven, Reardon, and Hopkins 2005; Damiani 2000; Chirwa et al. 
2005; Attwood and Baviskar 1987; Bernard et al. 2006).
1 This growing literature documents the external 
and internal conditions under which these cooperatives may be more or less effective at serving their 
members. Less studied, however, is the effective impact of collective action on members’ level of 
commercialization compared to their likely situation had they not been members. One reason is the 
inherent challenge of addressing selection biases in both the location and the membership of these 
organizations. This is where we hope to contribute to the literature, by providing a diagnosis of the 
effective impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ marketing behavior, in the context of Ethiopia. 
  Cooperatives have a long and tumultuous history in Ethiopia, starting from the Imperial era and 
continuing through the military regime (the Derg, 1974–1991). The largely negative experiences of 
cooperatives led to their dissolution following the fall of the Derg. In 1994 the Government of Ethiopia 
expressed renewed interest in collective action to promote greater market participation by smallholders ( 
                                                 
1 See also the several case studies presented at a recent workshop on “Collective Action and Market Access for 
Smallholders” organized by the CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) at 
www.capri.cgiar.org/wks_marketrel.asp.  2 
FDRE 1994 and FDRE 1998).
2,3 Accordingly, “it has become necessary to establish cooperative societies 
which are formed of individuals on voluntary basis and who have similar needs for creating savings and 
mutual assistance among themselves by pooling their resources, knowledge and property; (...) it has 
become necessary to enable cooperative societies to actively participate in the free market system” 
(FDRE 1998). This was later re-affirmed in the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program 
(SDPRP) (FDRE 2002) and the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP) (FDRE 2005), in which cooperatives are given a central role in the country’s rural 
development strategy. 
  In 2002, the Federal Cooperative Agency of Ethiopia was created to organize and promote 
cooperatives at the national level. Its ambitious five-year development plan (2006–2010) aims to provide 
cooperative services to 70 percent of the population through the presence of at least one such organization 
in each kebele
4 by 2010. (In 2005 when our data was collected the figure was 35 percent.) We use this 
strong government effort to promote cooperatives to assume that the decision of where to establish a 
cooperative is largely driven by external considerations, and is thus exogenous to the members 
themselves. This is further supported by cooperative-level data indicating that only 26 percent of these 
organizations were initiated by members themselves. Controlling for a set of observable variables, such as 
market access, population density, and agricultural potential, one can therefore compare households living 
in kebeles with access to a cooperative to similar households living in comparable kebeles but without 
access to such an organization. 
  Our analysis reveals four major findings. First, cooperatives have developed strongly in the 
country since the mid-1990s, with the percentage of districts with at least one such organization having 
reached nearly 35 percent in 2005, from less than 15 percent ten years before. However, this national 
average hides important disparities across and within regions, in particular that these organizations are 
more likely to be found in districts that already have better than average access to markets and lower 
exposure to price and environmental risks. 
  Second, at the household-level we find that membership in cooperatives remains low (less than 
10 percent) and that poorer households in a given community appear to be less likely to participate, 
although the cooperatives themselves are meant to be non-discriminatory. 
                                                 
2 Smallholders represent the vast majority of Ethiopian farmers: about 37 percent of the farming households in the country 
cultivate less than 0.5 hectares and about 87 percent cultivate less than 2 hectares. Only 12.8 percent of farmers own more than 2 
hectares of land and 0.9 percent more than 5 hectares (CSA 2003) 
3 In Ethiopia, empirical estimates show that 28 percent of the total agricultural output is commercialized (Dessalegn et al., 
1998).  More recent estimates suggest that among all teff producers, only 38 percent sell part or all of their production, and the 
figure is even lower for the other cereals (Alemu, Pender, Dejene, and Gabre-Madhin 2006). 
4 In Ethiopia kebeles or peasant associations (PAs) are the smallest administrative unit below the woreda (district) level. For 
purposes of comparison, kebeles correspond to villages in other countries. 3 
  Third, the analysis of the impact of cooperatives on their members’ cereals commercialization 
shows nuanced results. On average, cooperatives do not have a significant effect on the share of 
members’ production effectively sold despite a significant price effect: the output price paid to members 
is on average 7 percent higher than the price paid to comparable non-members. 
  Fourth, this can be explained by an important degree of heterogeneity among members. In 
particular, we find that smaller farmers tend to sell less as a result of their membership of cooperatives, 
while larger farmers sell more. This cannot be explained by differences in the price received by small and 
large farmers, as we do not find such differences within the cooperative.   
  We begin this paper by briefly describing the data used (Section 2), before detailing the incidence 
of cooperatives, and investigating the determinants of their presence as well as of households’ 
membership levels (Section 3). The methodological considerations of measuring the impact of 
cooperatives are discussed in Section 4, and the corresponding matching is described in Section 5. Section 
6 presents the impact of cooperatives on members’ commercialization behavior. In Section 7 we 
investigate further by looking at the heterogeneity of cooperatives’ impact across members. Section 8 
concludes.  4 
2.  DATA 
This diagnostic is based on a new dataset specifically collected to investigate the commercialization 
behavior of Ethiopian smallholders. The Ethiopian Smallholders Commercialization Survey (ESCS) was 
jointly designed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the Ethiopian Development 
Research Institute, and the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia to support an in-depth analysis of 
smallholders’ commercialization behavior. Data were collected during June and July 2005 from 7,186 
households randomly drawn from 293 kebeles. The sample is considered statistically representative at the 
national level and regional level for four regions: Amhara, Oromia, Tigray, and the Southern Nations, 
Nationalities, and Peoples regional state (SNNP). 
  At the community level, the ESCS collected information on population, infrastructure, markets 
prices, institutions, and development programs. At the household level, the ESCS covered many 
variables, including demographics, human capital, employment, land production and input use, crop and 
livestock production and sales over the previous 24 months, marketing channels and contractual 
arrangements, physical assets, social capital and participation in cooperatives, as well as primary 
information on the cooperative itself. Note, however, that the ESCS did not collect information on 
household consumption and expenditure. 5 
3.  WHERE AND WHO: INCIDENCE OF COOPERATIVES IN ETHIOPIA 
In this section, we review the incidence of cooperatives in Ethiopia, and smallholders’ membership of 
cooperatives. The overall effect of these organizations will greatly depend on their actual extent, location, 
and the characteristics of their members. 
Prevalence of Cooperatives in Rural Ethiopia 
As a result of the government policies described in Section 1, the number of cooperatives has grown 
rapidly in Ethiopia during the past decade. Figure 1 show how the number of kebeles in the research areas 
with at least one cooperative went up from only 10 percent in 1991, to nearly 35 percent in 2005. One can 
also see, however, that much of this trend is explained by the rapid spread of cooperatives in Tigray, from 
only 12 percent of kebeles having a cooperative in 1991 to a staggering 83 percent in 2005 















  However, one needs to investigate membership rates to obtain a clearer picture of the effective 
reach of these organizations. The percentage of households participating in at least one cooperative 
involved in agriculture is shown in Table 1. As indicated in Column 1, only 9 percent of all farm 
households report participating in a cooperative, even though 35 percent of all kebeles have a cooperative. 6 
Table 1.  Incidence of household participation in cooperatives among smallholder farmers in 
Ethiopia 
  1 2 3 
% Smallholders 
participating in a 
cooperative 
% Smallholders with a 
cooperative in their kebele 
% Smallholders 
participating when they 
have a cooperative in their 
kebele 
 
% hh  diff/national:
Prob >F  % hh  diff/national:
Prob >F  % hh  diff/national:
Prob >F 
        
Average 9.14    39.59    16.87   
        
Tigray  20.40 0.0057 87.99 0.0000 20.93 0.3511 
Amhara  14.48 0.0630 46.34 0.0000 24.29 0.1362 
Oromia  7.35 0.3026  42.54  0.0046  12.18  0.1446 
SNNP 3.69  0.0000 18.49 0.0000  8.96  0.0391 
  We also note significant differences in membership rates across regions, with 20 percent of the 
smallholders in Tigray participating in cooperatives, while less than 4 percent of people in SNNP 
participate. Part of this difference is driven by level of saturation of the cooperatives. Thus, as reported in 
Column 2, 88 percent of smallholders in Tigray have at least one cooperative within their kebele, 
compared to less than 20 percent in SNNP. However, we note from Column 3, that even when there is an 
organization in their kebele, smallholders in SNNP are still less likely to participate in cooperatives, with 
only 9 percent participation, which is below the study’s average membership of 17 percent for 
smallholders with a cooperative in their kebele. We investigate the determinants of this heterogeneity 
below. 
Where are the Cooperatives and Who are their Members? 
The existence of a cooperative in any given kebele is not the result of a random process. And a 
household’s decision to participate in such an organization is likely to be driven by its expected profit 
from the organization. Here we briefly assess the main correlates of cooperatives’ location and household 
participation. 
  On the question of location, a set of Logit estimates are used to derive the probability that a 
cooperative exists in a given kebele, using a variety of independent variables. These variables include the 
total population of the kebele, the presence of an all-weather road within the kebele, and the distance (in 
kilometres) from the center of the kebele to the first major market for agricultural goods. We also 
computed a measure of the proportion of local disputes resolved through the Shimagile institution
5 (as 
                                                 
5 The Shimagile (elders) is the organization that traditionally governs Ethiopian communities. 7 
opposed to either kebele or district-level courts), as a proxy for the importance of traditional community 
institutions in the kebele. We measure the community’s exposure to income risks through an index of the 
price variability of the main agricultural product produced in the kebele (measured as the standard 
deviation over the past three years, for the price in January), and the mean level of this price (average 
price in January over the past three years). We use a proxy measure for environmental risk through a 
rainfall variability index, computed as the coefficient of variation of yearly rainfalls in the kebele, since 
1964. Finally, we use regional dummies to control for other unobserved factors that could influence the 
presence of such organization.
6 
  We present three different estimates, increasing each time the number of independent variables, 
in order to investigate the robustness of our coefficients. The results, shown in Table 2, are relatively 
clear, indicating that larger kebeles are more likely to have a cooperative, whereas more remote ones are 
less likely to have one. One can interpret these coefficients as proxies for market access, which tend to 
favor the emergence of cooperatives. In Columns 2 and 3 we test for the significance of our risk exposure 
measures (in terms of price and weather). Results indicate a negative relationship between the likelihood 
that a cooperative exists in a given kebele, and the kebele’s exposure to risks. 
These findings have relatively strong implications in terms of the cooperatives’ benefit to smallholders. 
They show that cooperatives are more likely to be located in kebeles with relatively lower marketing 
constraints: better market access and lower exposure to environmental and price risks. 
  Furthermore, as Table 1 showed, only a limited number of households tend to participate in 
cooperatives, even when there is a cooperative in their kebele (17 percent). We now explore further the 
determinants of household membership in cooperatives, using the subset of kebeles with at least one 
agricultural cooperative. The analysis relies on Logit estimates of the probability of household 
membership, using a variety of household characteristics as well as regional dummies. As shown in Table 
3, the results are robust to the introduction of various control variables as well as regional fixed effects. 
                                                 
6 As is clear from Figure 1, regional factors play a major role in the development and dynamism of cooperatives. 8 
Table 2.  Determinants of the presence of cooperatives  
Marginal effect at mean of 
independent variable 
(std error)  Dep: There is at least one cooperative in the kebele in 
         2005 
Mean 
(std dev) 
1 2 3 
Population  (x100)  46.11  0.004 0.003 0.001 
 (25.32)  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002) 
All-weather  road  0/1 0.168 0.167 0.136 
   (0.063)***  (0.067)***  (0.083)* 
Distance to main market  13.19  -0.003  -0.004  -0.006 
 (16.17)  (0.002)^  (0.002)^  (0.003)* 
% conflict resolved in Shimagile  56.99  0.030 0.033 0.082 
 (49.59)  (0.061)  (0.067)  (0.079) 
Average price level  162.50    0.001  0.001 
 (77.43)    (0.000)*  (0.000)** 
Price variability  21.96    -0.002  -0.003 
 (29.82)    (0.001)*  (0.002)* 
Rainfall variability  83.72    0.004  -0.006 
 (26.17)    (0.001)***  (0.003)** 
Regional fixed effects        yes 
Prob > Chi2    0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2   0.068  0.1214  0.2220 
Number of observations    272  247  224 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** = Signif at 1% level. ** = Signif at 5% level., * = Signif at 10% level. 
 
 9 
Table 3.  Determinants of households’ participation in cooperatives 
Marginal effect at mean of 
independent variable  
(std error)  
Dep: Household participates in at least one  
         cooperative 
Mean 
(std dev) 
1 2 3 
       
Household size  5.13  0.015
  0.014
  0.019 
 (2.25)  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
       
Age of the household head  44.4  0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (44.36)  (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
Hh head is a woman  0/1  -0.064 -0.063 -0.045 
   (0.021)*** (0.021)***  (0.021)** 
Hh head is literate  0/1  0.095 0.094 0.101 
   (0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.021)*** 
       
Landholding (ha)  1.35  0.043 0.056 0.051 
 (1.25)  (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.001)*** 
(Landholding (ha))
2 
   -0.002  -0.001 
    (0.001)*  (0.000)* 
       
Ethnicity dummies       Yes 
Regional fixed effects       Yes 
       
Prob > Chi2    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R
2   0.067  0.081  0.1283 
Number  of  observations    2224 2224 2193 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** = Signif at 1% level. ** = Signif at 5% level. * = Signif at 10% level. 
Overall, education and landholding
7 seem to be the dominant variables explaining household 
participation in cooperatives. Thus, the probability that a household participates in a cooperative is 
increased by 10 percent if the household head is literate.
8 Participation also increases by 5 percent for 
each additional hectare of land. We note, however, that the marginal effect of landholding decreases with 
the amount of land. Eventually, very large farm households (holding more than 14 hectares) are less likely 
to participate.
9 
                                                 
7 Land in Ethiopia is the property of the state and cannot be owned by individual farmers. Nevertheless, land is allocated to 
households for an undetermined period. Although land cannot be sold, it can be rented out and eventually passed on to heirs. The 
variable we use here as landholding is the amount of land allocated by the state to the household. It is considered as exogenous 
and does not capture land rented-in or rented-out by the farmer. For a detailed description of the Ethiopian land tenure system, 
see Gebreselassie (2006). 
8 Overall, the literacy rate among non-members approaches 27% while it reaches 40% among members. If one considers that 
literacy is somewhat pre-determined with regard to participation, and that the effect is not driven by other household’s 
unobservable characteristics, then education and literacy programs may constitute a powerful tool to promote participation into 
cooperatives. Testing these assumptions would however require a more sophisticated estimation of the participation equation, 
which is outside of the scope of this paper. 
9 Such “middle-class effects” are often observed in the collective action literature. See for example Weinberger and Jutting 
(2001). 10 
  These results raise some concern about the capacity of cooperatives to improve market 
participation by smallholder producers in Ethiopia. The results rather suggest that, despite their rapid 
development during the past decade, cooperatives remain marginal in their importance to smallholders (9 
percent membership), tend to be located where there are few marketing constraints, and provide services 
to households that are already better educated and have larger landholdings.
10 From a methodological 
perspective, these results also show – as expected – that direct intra-kebele comparisons of members with 
non-members will lead to bias estimates;
11 the same is true for a simple comparison of households in 
kebeles with and kebeles without cooperatives. Instead, we propose in the following sections a two-step 
propensity-score matching approach to overcome biases due to both the location of the cooperative and 
the self-selection of members into these organizations. 
                                                 
10 On average, cooperative members control 1.75 hectares, whereas non-members living in kebeles with a cooperative 
control 1.19 hectares. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level. 
11 It is difficult a priori to sign the bias of the direct effect of cooperatives on their members’ commercialization behavior. 
While members’ self selection may lead to an overstatement of the effect of cooperatives, it is likely that cooperatives exert 
spillover effects in their communities (e.g. non-members are sometimes allowed to sell their output through the cooperative), 
leading to a downward bias on the estimate of their impact on members.  11 
4.  WHAT: COOPERATIVES’ IMPACT ON MEMBERS’ COMMERCIALIZATION 
We saw in the previous section that relatively better-off households tend to participate more in 
cooperatives. However, other non-observable aspects may also be at play, such as the household’s risk 
preferences, its entrepreneurial spirit, or its relationship to other cooperative members. Thus, a simple 
comparison between households that are members of a cooperative, with household that are not members, 
even within the same kebele and after controlling for observable characteristics, would lead to biased 
estimates. This is due to the fact that because people self-select into cooperatives, the observed 
differences between members and non-members may either totally or partially reflect original differences 
between them, instead of the effects of the cooperative as such. 
  To overcome this selection bias, a proper evaluation would require a comparison at the same 
point in time between (a) the commercialization behavior of a given household when it is a member of a 
cooperative and (b) the commercialization behavior of the same household when it is not member of the 
cooperative. Obviously, such double observation is not feasible. Instead, we propose here to use 
propensity-score matching techniques, as described in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), or later in 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998), and now used extensively in the economic evaluation literature 
(Jalan and Ravallion 2003a). In studies on agriculture and rural development, the application of these 
techniques includes, for example, impact assessments of farmers field schools (Gotland et al. 2004) and 
community-driven development (Rao and Ibanez 2003), or assessments of infrastructure investments such 
as pipe water (Jalan and Ravallion 2003b) and road rehabilitation (Van de Walle and Cratty 2002). 
  We propose here a two-step propensity-score matching approach to overcome biases due to both 
the location of the cooperative and the self-selection of members into these organizations. In our setting, 
the propensity score ) (x p , is defined as the probability that a given household would participate in a 
cooperative, given a set of observable characteristics, x. The underlying assumption is that, conditional on 
the propensity score, members and non-members of the cooperatives become comparable. However, since 
x  may only capture a household’s observable characteristics despite the fact that less directly observable 
factors may be influencing the household’s decision to join a cooperative (for example, the household’s 
social capital stock or its entrepreneurship spirit), the distribution of unobservable characteristics may 
systematically differ between members and non-members, leading to a biased estimate of the impact of 
cooperatives.
12 
                                                 
12 Other sources of bias when comparing members and non-members within the same kebele may come from the likely 
existence of spillover effects of the cooperative’s activity on non-members. For example, we sometimes observe that non-
members are allowed to sell their output through the cooperative (although it is generally not true). In other cases, a successful 
cooperative may exert market pressures on local traders through increased competition. Finally, non-members may benefit from 
economic dynamism generated by a cooperative in its community (for example through processing activities). Overall, these 
spillover effects will tend to exert a downward bias on the measure of the cooperative’s impact on their members.  12 
  These potential sources of bias can be overcome by comparing cooperative members to 
households with similar propensity scores living in comparable kebeles without cooperatives. However, 
non-observable factors may also be at play in the location of cooperatives. In particular, in the case of 
member-created cooperatives, such organizations are often associated with the presence of effective 
leadership or other community-specific factors that enable such a group to emerge independently of 
exogenous policy targets. As such, observed differences in marketing behavior between households that 
are members of cooperatives and similar households in kebeles without cooperatives would lead to biased 
estimates, even after controlling for the kebeles’ observable characteristics. 
  In Ethiopia however, most cooperatives were initiated at the instigation of an external partner: 63 
percent were created by government institutions, 11 percent by a donor agency or NGO, and only 26 
percent by members themselves. Dropping from our sample those kebeles in which cooperatives were 
created by their members, we assume that the establishment of cooperatives is exogenous from 
communities’ unobservable characteristics
13 as well as from that of their members. It follows that 
differences in unobservable characteristics between cooperative members and households with similar 
propensity scores (but leaving in kebeles without cooperatives) is considered as random and will not bias 
the estimator. This is represented in equation (1) below, where y is the measured outcome (for example, 
the percentage of the household’s production that is commercialized); c is equal to 1 for the households 
living in a kebele where there is a cooperative and 0 otherwise; and the subscripts c and c / denote 
participation and non-participation, respectively. 
[ ] [ ] |1 , ( ) |0 , ( ) | ( ) cc Eyc px Eyc px Ey y px / =−= = − ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦      (1) 
  It can be argued that even though households are fully comparable, certain environmental 
conditions may also affect the cooperative’s impact on each household’s marketing behavior. We address 
this issue by matching kebeles with and kebeles without cooperatives that share similar sets of 
development constraints and opportunities, using the development domains developed for Ethiopia by 
Chamberlain, Pender, and Yu (2006) and discussed in detail later. 
  One may also argue that households need to have access to the same markets for the propensity 
score to provide reliable estimates of the cooperatives’ impact (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998). 
Although several studies have found that market integration has significantly increased in Ethiopia since 
the liberalization of the early 1990s (Dercon 1995 Negassa and Jayne 1997 Negassa 1998), it is likely that 
geographic location still matters. However, as will be shown later, in the sample retained for this analysis 
kebeles with and kebeles without cooperatives are quite evenly distributed across the territory, suggesting 
that such bias – if it exists – is of limited importance. 
                                                 
13 This assumption is further supported by the government’s objective that there should be one primary cooperative in each 
kebele of the country by 2010, such that the present extent of cooperative coverage can be thought of as an intermediate stage in 
the phasing-in of a nationwide cooperative coverage plan. 13 
5.  MATCHING 
In this section we describe in detail the matching procedure. We propose a two-step matching procedure 
where we first match kebeles with cooperatives to similar ones without cooperatives (5.1), before 
matching members of cooperatives to households that could have participated had they had access (5.2). 
Matching Kebeles 
As mentioned earlier, we consider the present allocation of cooperatives to be exogenous and are thus 
able to conduct a simple matching of kebeles based on selected observable characteristics. However, this 
assumption can only hold for kebeles where no cooperatives were created by members themselves, 
reducing our overall sample from 293 to 223 kebeles. To add to the robustness of our estimates, we also 
remove from the sample the 11 kebeles where households are said to have access to cooperatives in 
nearby kebeles. Overall, our sample consist of 66 treatment kebeles (where at least one cooperative can be 
found), and 146 control kebeles (where there are no cooperatives). 
  The next step is to ensure that the treatment kebeles are sufficiently comparable to the control 
ones. To do so, we apply the notion of development domains provided by Chamberlain, Pender, and Yu 
(2006) to the kebele level.
14 Development domains are defined as geographic locations sharing broadly 
similar rural development constraints and opportunities. The classification is based on the combination of 
four characteristics that best capture the livelihood heterogeneity among smallholders in Ethiopia. These 
characteristics are altitude, population density, distance to the closest market, and moisture reliability. 
Their aggregation is based on thresholds established to maximize the predictive power of the domains on 
local livelihood patterns. A recent analytical innovation, the ‘development domain framework’, is 
increasingly used by various government and donor agencies involved in rural development in Ethiopia. 
  In our sample, kebeles can be classified into 22 different domains. To test the validity of these 
domains as predictors for the existence of cooperatives (again, only the ones created by the government or 
by another external partner), we use a Probit estimate where the dependent variable is the existence or 
absence of a cooperative, and the independent variables are dummy variables for each of the domains. 
Overall, this test performs relatively well in that domains successfully predict 70 percent of the existence 
of cooperatives. Table 4 below presents the distribution of our treatment and control kebeles across the 22 
different domains. 
                                                 
14 Chamberlain, Pender, and Yu (2006) calculate domain at the Woreda (district) level. Using their framework, we have re-
calculated domains at the kebele (village) level.  14 
Table 4.  Treatment and control kebeles, by development domains 





1  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, high population density  8.97  13.64 
2  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, medium population 
density 
24.83  21.21 
3  Highland, moisture reliable, high market access, low population density  2.07  4.55 
4  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, high population density  4.14  0.00 
5  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, medium population 
density 
20.00  10.61 
6  Highland, moisture reliable, low market access, low population density  2.76  0.00 
7  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access, medium population density  3.45  1.52 
8  Lowland, moisture reliable, high market access, low population density  0.69  0.00 
9  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access, medium population density  1.38  3.03 
10  Lowland, moisture reliable, low market access, low population density  4.83  0.00 
11  Highland, drought prone, high market access, high population density  1.38  1.52 
12  Highland, drought prone, high market access, medium population 
density 
2.76  12.12 
13  Highland, drought prone, high market access, low population density  1.38  1.52 
14  Highland, drought prone, low market access, high population density  1.38  1.52 
15  Highland, drought prone, low market access, medium population density  3.45  13.64 
16  Highland, drought prone, low market access, low population density  2.07  3.03 
17  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, high population density  1.38  0.00 
18  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, medium population density 0.69  3.03 
19  Lowland, drought prone, high market access, low population density 2.67  1.52 
20  Lowland, drought prone, low market access, medium population density 2.07  3.03 
21  Lowland, drought prone, low market access, low population density  4.83  3.03 
22  Lowland, pastoralist, high market access, low population density  2.76  1.52 




  Next, according to our matching procedure we need to ensure that a sufficient number of 
treatment and control kebeles exist within each domain. It appears from Table 6 that five domains (1, 2, 5, 
12 and 15) capture more than 70 percent of the kebeles with at least one externally created cooperative, 
while the remaining 30 percent are dispersed among 12 of the remaining 17 domains. It also appears that 
these five domains include enough control kebeles to perform the analysis. Finally, although selective, 
these five domains are quite heterogeneous, with the only domain attribute not represented being the 
lowland areas. Some domains are highland moisture-reliable domains (1, 2, 5), while the others are 
highland, drought-prone domains (12 and 15); some have high market access (1, 2, 13), while the others 
are more remote (5 and 12); most have medium population density (2, 5, 12, 15), while one is more 15 
densely populated (1). Overall, we further refine our sample by focusing on treatment and control kebeles 
within these five development domains. 
  To further check the sample’s validity, we present in Table 5 the distribution of treatment and 
control kebeles across the administrative regions of Ethiopia. There is a Federal Cooperative Agency, but 
it is the Regional Cooperative Offices who decide where and how cooperatives should be promoted, 
through directives passed to woreda cooperatives offices. As a result, and as was clear from Figure 1, 
there are important differences in cooperative development across regions which may need to be 
accounted for in the present analysis. 
Table 5.  Treatment and control kebeles, distribution by region 
  Tigray Amhara Oromia Beneshangul 
– Gumuz 
SNNP Harari  Total 
Control kebeles 1  25  37  1  22  1  87 
Treatment kebeles 14  8  19  0  6  0  47 
  As shown in Table 5, only three regions – Amhara, Oromia and SNNP – display a relatively 
balanced sample between treatment and control kebeles. In Tigray only one kebele was missing a 
cooperative in 2005, while Beneshangul-Gumuz and Harari only have one kebele included in the sample. 
A further refinement of the sample may thus be limited to Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNP regions. In 
Table 6, we test the balancing properties of both samples – including and excluding Tigray, Beneshangul-
Gumuz and Harari. Indeed, as was discussed in Section 3, the appropriateness of the sample used is based 
on whether the treatment kebeles are sufficiently comparable to the control ones. 
  As shown in Table 6, the sample using all regions performs poorly, evidenced by a significant 
difference between treatment and control kebeles in 50 percent of the tests performed. By comparison, the 
sample restricted to Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP performs relatively better, as the kebeles are on average 
similar in all dimensions covered by these tests. As such, we reject the suitability of the full sample and 
restrict ourselves to the sub-sample comprised of three regions which includes 33 treatment and 84 
control kebeles. 16 
Table 6.  Balancing tests: Treatment and control kebeles 














Population 4584.66  5454.64 0.0693 4566.45 4713.06 0.7812
% female-headed hh  14.65  21.43 0.0201 14.64 18.27 0.2666
% hh Orthodox  45.41  57.85 0.1500 44.60 42.61  0.8327
% hh Muslim 40.31  25.52 0.1313 39.85 33.14  0.5445
% hh speak Amharic  54.21  46.55 0.2910 56.02 59.85  0.6316
Commercial bank 11.49  12.76 0.8301 11.90 18.18  0.3782
Micro-finance institution  25.28  46.80 0.0111 23.80 30.30 0.4734
Importance of Shimagile 48.81  46.00 0.8629 46.69 50.96  0.4266
Number of  1.76  2.54 0.0004 1.77 2.06 0.1958
PSNP* 26.43  38.29 0.1574 25.00 27.27  0.8021
Primary school  87.35  91.48 0.4727 86.90 87.87  0.8884
Seasonal/dry road  52.87  68.08 0.0897 53.57 57.57 0.6984
Safe water 44.82  65.95 0.0193 45.23 54.54 0.3688
Number obs  87  47    84  33   
Note:  In bold, differences significant at the 10% level. 
*kebele is covered by the Productive Safety Net Program. 
  One last validity check was undertaken to ensure that treatment and control kebeles correspond to 
sufficiently similar locations, that is that the treatment and control observations have the same markets for 
their comparisons to be valid. Indeed, in the case where the treatment kebeles are clustered in different 
areas from the control kebeles, one could argue that the estimated differences between treatment and 
control reflect more local conditions than impacts of the cooperatives. 
  Figure 2 shows the geographic location of each kebele in our sub-sample against a background 
shading that indicates the level of market access for each kebele based on the development domain 
calculations. We find that (a) treatment and control groups are geographically mixed, thereby ensuring 
that the impact of cooperatives will not be driven by area-specific characteristics, and (b) the distribution 
of treatment and control kebeles by level of market access is also fairly balanced. 
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Figure 2.  Geographical location of treatment and control kebeles (PAs) 
 
Matching Households 
As a result of the above exercise, the sub-sample now includes a total of 2,614 households, of which 
1,798 are in control kebeles and 816 are in treatment kebeles. Among the latter, 142 are cooperative 
members (see Table 7).
15 Recall that the rationale for propensity-score matching is to compare households 
that are members of cooperatives with households in kebeles without cooperatives who would probably 
have been members had they had access to such an organization. In other words, we will match the 142 
household members in the treatment kebeles, or the “treated households,” to households among the 1,798 
in the control kebeles that most resemble them. For this, we first estimate each treatment kebele 
household’s “propensity score” or likelihood of joining a cooperative using a flexible Probit model where 
the dependent variable is membership status. Domain fixed effects are used to ensure matching within the 
                                                 
15 Although the sub-sample still includes a majority of the initial treatment kebeles, our efforts to increase robustness may 
come at the expense of national representativeness of the results. 18 
domains.
16 Household characteristics include measures of the household’s assets (education level, radio 
ownership, non-farm income, landholding, livestock, and so on) introduced linearly as well as 
quadratically to augment the model’s predictive power. Finally, a set of dummy variables are included to 
account for the household’s cultivation of a particular cereal crop.
17, 18 
Table 7.  Distribution of households across treatment and control kebeles 
  Control kebeles Treatment  kebeles Total 
Non-cooperative members  1,798  674  2,472 
Cooperative member  0  142  142 
Total 1,798  816  2,614 
  The Probit estimate is better identified when undertaken on treatment kebeles only where the 
choice to join a cooperative does exist. We report estimates of the coefficients in Table 8. We also report 
the associated p-values, although the purpose here is not to identify particular relationships, but rather to 
maximize the predictive power of the model. We find that the model correctly predicts 85 percent of the 
observed membership in cooperatives. These coefficients are then used to generate propensity scores for 
the households living in control kebeles, determining which would probably have participated had they 
had access to a cooperative. On the basis of these propensity scores, households participating in 
cooperatives are matched to similar ones in kebeles without access to such an organization. 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, one could have performed the matching separately for each domain (and eventually proceed similarly for 
the estimate of the Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of cooperative membership on household behavior). However, as is clear 
from this relatively small sample of treated observations, this would have been too constraining on the data.  
17 All households in this sample are involved in cereal production. 
18 One may argue that involvement in the production of a particular cereal may well be a response to participation into the 
cooperative. As such, the estimated impact may be downward biased as it may not take into account a household’s change in 
production towards higher profit products. However, the purpose of the present paper is to investigate the cooperatives’ impact 
on smallholders’ marketing behavior. As such, one wants to compare the marketing behavior of households engaged in similar 
production, whether or not this was driven by the cooperative. In addition, the present estimates are limited to cereals, the 
production of which is largely driven by soil and weather conditions in Ethiopia (teff is mainly cultivated in highland areas north 
of Addis Ababa, maize in the lowlands south of Addis Ababa, sorghum in the north-west and the east, and barley along a north-
south meridian in the middle of the country (Atlas of the Ethiopian Rural Economy 2006 p 59). Finally, all the estimates 
presented here were also performed without cereal dummies included, as well as with the actual level of each production. In all 
cases, there was no significant change in the results. 19 
Table 8.  Probit estimate of determinants of cooperative participation 
 Coefficient  p-value    Coefficient  p-value 
Age of household head  0.012  0.006  Number of small 
ruminant owned
0.040 0.180 




Household head is literate  -0.003  0.979  Number of poultry owned  0.013  0.685 
Household size  0.063  .0631  (Number of poultry  -0.000  0.673 
(Household size)
2  -0.004 0.683  Produces  teff  0.297  0.043 
Radio ownership  0.087  0.550  Produces wheat  -0.065  0.693 
Household receives non-
farm income 
-0.103 0.438  Produces  maize  -0.270  0.099 
Number of hectares held  0.600  0.000  Produces barley  -0.653  0.000 
(Number of hectares held)
2  -0.058 0.018  Produces  sorghum  -0.176  0.227 
Number of oxen owned  0.049  0.734  Produces oats  -0.798  0.162 
(Number of oxen owned)
2  0.004 0.876  Produces  dagussa -0.556  0.026 
Number of cattle owned  0.019  0.701  Development domain  yes   
(Number of cattle owned)
2  -0.002 0.403  Constant    -1.399  0.023 
Number of households      Non- Member  Total   
Pseudo-R
2:                    Predicted  614  93  707   
Correct prediction rate:         Predicted  28  47  75   
   Total  642  140  782   
  Several matching techniques can be used to match treatment and control households. Here we 
focus on two widely used methods, the non-parametric Kernel-regression matching proposed by 
Heckman, Ishimura, and Todd (1998), and five-nearest-neighbors matching. In the first case, each treated 
household is matched with the entire sample of controls. However, each control observation enters the 
estimate with a weight inversely proportional to its distance to the treatment observation based on the 
propensity score distribution. For the second method, each treatment observation is matched with an 
average value of its five nearest control neighbors, again based on the propensity-score distribution. To 
ensure maximum comparability of the treatment and control groups, the sample is restricted to the 
common support region, defined as the values of propensity scores where both treatment and control 
observations can be found. 
  A straightforward way to test the validity of the matching procedure is to compare the 
characteristics of an average household within the treatment sample to the corresponding characteristics 
of the control group generated. An absence of significant differences between the treatment and control 
groups will suggest a valid matching. We thus undertake a series of statistical tests for differences in 
household characteristics on three different samples: (a) cooperative members in treatment kebeles 20 
compared to all households in the control kebeles (an unmatched sample); (b) cooperative members in 
treatment kebeles compared to a subset of households in the control kebeles with kernel-based matching; 
and (c) cooperative members in treatment kebeles compared to a subset of households in the control 
kebeles selected through the five-nearest-neighbors matching method. 
  As shown in Table 9, the unmatched sample fails to satisfy the balancing properties in that 
households in treatment kebeles are on average significantly different in several aspects from the 
households in the control kebeles (Column 1). However, when we use kernel-based matching, no such 
significant differences appear after kernel-based weights are attributed to control observations (Column 
2). Finally, in the case of the five-nearest-neighbors matching, only two significant differences are 
observed, in the gender of the household head and the number of ruminants owned. Overall, these results 
suggest that matched samples are adequate to perform an impact analysis, whereas the non-matched 
samples are not. 21 
Table 9.  Balancing tests of matched samples 



























Age of head of hh  48.529  42.993  0.000  48.28 49.52  0.519  48.28  49.29  0.598 
Gender of head of hh  1.10  1.18  0.012  1.10 1.06  0.220  1.10  1.04  0.043 
Hh head is literate  0.37  0.31  0.104  0.38  0.34  0.542  0.38  0.36  0.705 
Household size  6.05  5.14  0.000  5.93 5.82  0.689  5.93  5.81  0.675 
Household owns radio  1.41  1.21  0.000  1.39 1.34  0.455  1.39  1.34  0.480 
Non-farm income  1.50  1.54  0.421  1.50  1.54  0.461  1.50  1.54  0.526 
Land-owning hh  2.186  1.35  0.000  2.05 2.17  0.465  2.05  2.19  0.386 
Hh owns oxen  1.67  0.89  0.000  1.54 1.45  0.588  1.54  1.54  0.980 
Hh owns cattle  5.30  3.42  0.000  4.97 4.63  0.468  4.97  4.87  0.839 
Hh owns ruminants  3.32  2.47  0.012  2.81 3.70  0.109  2.81  3.89  0.052 
Hh owns poultry  3.69  2.06  0.000  3.69 3.11  0.253  3.69  3.13  0.263 
Hh produces cereal  1156.8  682.76  0.000  1086.8 1018.6  0.628  1086.8  1042.2  0.765 
                  
Note: In bold: difference is statistically significant at a 10% level. 
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6.  AVERAGE IMPACT OF COOPERATIVES 
This section presents estimates of the average impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ commercialization 
behavior in Ethiopia. We start in 6.1 by defining the dependent variables used in the estimates, before 
turning to the actual results in 6.2. 
Measures of Smallholders’ Commercialization Behavior 
Several types of indicators can be used to capture commercialization behavior. Commercialization 
behavior may encompass both the conditions under which a given level of output is sold to market, and 
the actual composition of the outputs (Alemu, Gabre-Madhin, and Dejene 2006). Indeed, a farmer’s 
involvement in producing cash crops such as coffee or khat rather than staple crops such as cereals may in 
itself reflect the commercial orientation of the household. In this paper, however, there are very few 
farmers producing cash crops who are also members of cooperatives. Due to this data limitation, we focus 
on the cooperatives’ capacity to provide market access to smallholders for major cereals crops (teff, 
sorghum, oats, maize, barley, wheat, and millet).
19 Our sample is therefore slightly reduced by focusing 
only on cooperatives with a stated involvement in the commercialization of cereals. 
  We assess the impact of cooperatives on smallholders’ commercialization through two types of 
indicators. We first consider a measure of the share of the cereal production that was sold in 2005, 
denoted PS. The expected outcomes are slightly ambiguous. Indeed, if cooperatives provide their 
members with a better price for their output, it may be that members’ liquidity constraints are relaxed for 
a lower level of output sold. In this case, the effect of cooperative membership on the percentage of 
production sold would be negative for households that are most cash-constrained, due to the income 
effect. (We return to these effects in Section 7 below.) 
  We then use a price indicator to capture whether cooperatives do, in fact, enable their members to 
obtain a higher price for their output. Although it may not fully capture the individual farmers’ 
commercialization behavior, it is a fundamental indicator since cooperatives’ promotion policies often 
rely on the assumption that collective action can help smallholders not only access more markets, but also 
get them a better price. The price indicator that we use is a weighted average of the difference between 
the price received by the household member for each type of cereal sold, and the average price in the 
sample. This is described in the expression below, where PDi is the household-level price indicator, lij is 
the proportion of land that was allocated to cereal j and sold by the household in 2005, pij is the price 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that 98 percent of grains produced in Ethiopia are produced by smallholders, of which 80 percent are 
cereals (Gabre-Madhin 2001). In addition, a recent study shows that 70 percent of all planted areas in Ethiopia are dedicated to 
cereals production (Alemu, Gabre-Madhin, and Dejene 2007). As such, our estimate is likely to reflect the general situation of 
non-pastoralist smallholders in the country. 23 
received by this household for product j, and  j p  is the average price received by the households sampled, 
for one kilogram of product j.
20 
  () . ii j i j j
j
PD l p p =− ∑        
  One may argue that the use of the sample average, j p , as the reference point is problematic. For 
instance, if cooperatives are located in areas with higher prices to start with, a higher price for cooperative 
members may wrongly be attributed to the cooperative’s efforts instead of local conditions. However, the 
use of local prices as the reference points may itself lead to downward bias, in that cooperatives are likely 
to exert spillover effects on local prices – either directly when they provide marketing services to non-
members, or indirectly through increased competition for traders. To avoid such biases, zonal or regional-
level aggregates as the reference point instead of the entire sample might be recommended. In this case 
however, the relatively small size of our sample at the zonal level as well as in some regions would 
provide us with imprecise estimates of the mean price. This in turn may severely affect the precision of 
our estimates.
21 Overall, the best evidence in support of the use of a sample-wide average is provided by 
the map in Figure 1, which shows relatively clearly that treatment and control kebeles are geographically 
well-balanced, such that local effects should be observed in similar magnitudes in both treatment and 
control samples. 
Average Impact of Cooperatives on their Members 
Based on the matched sample, we compute measures of cooperatives’ impact on their members’ 
commercialization. The “average treatment effect on the treated” (ATT) measures the average difference 
between members’ commercialization indicators and the commercialization behavior of their 
corresponding match. Because analytical standard errors are not computable for the Kernel-density 
matching methods, we use 100 bootstrap replications with sampling stratified at the development domain 
level to compute robust estimates for them. Note that the bootstrapped standard errors for the five-nearest-
neighbor estimator are very close to their analytical counterparts. For clarity, we only report the 
bootstrapped estimates in Table 10. 
                                                 
20 In this indicator, the aggregation process across crops is meant to capture the effects of the household’s crop production 
profile. Li  and lij were proxied using the quantity sold by the household for each crop, and the national average yields for these 
crops computed by CSA for the years 2003 and 2004. Note, however, that all price-related estimates were also performed on non-
weighted aggregates without significant effects on the results. 
21 As a robustness check, we have also run all the following estimates on the sub-sample of kebeles from the Oromia region 
only. Indeed, Oromia is the only region in our sample that offers a large enough sample size (both in terms of clusters (kebeles) 
and in terms of observations (households)) to obtain a relatively precise estimate of the mean price received by farmers. The 
results, although slightly greater in magnitude, were similar in their sign and statistical significance as the ones in Table 10.  
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  We start with the price difference (PD) indicator and find that on average, cooperative members 
receive 7 percent higher prices for their cereal products than their non-member counterparts. This effect is 
statistically significant and robust across both matching techniques. Although surprisingly large, this 
effect is consistent with the idea that cooperatives are able to provide reduced transaction costs to their 
members, through bargaining power over traders, to benefit from economies of scale in 
commercialization, or to reach more attractive markets. Turning to the share of production sold (PS), 
however, we find that cooperative membership does not have an impact significantly different from zero. 
Table 10.  Effect of cooperatives on members’ cereals commercialization 
 Kernel-based  matching Five-nearest-neighbors 
matching 
  ATT  Std. error  ATT  Std. error 
% Price difference (PD)  6.745  2.868**  7.608  4.321* 
% Production sold (PS)  0.601  2.046  0.930  2.531 
 Notes:  Stratified bootstrap with 100 replications are used to estimate the standard errors. ** Significant at 5%. 
 * Significant at 10%. 
  These results may in part reflect the troubled history of cooperatives in Ethiopia, and the fact that 
distrust of cooperatives persists among members and non-members alike. Information obtained through 
key informant interviews and a subsequent survey of cooperatives in Ethiopia suggests that suspicion and 
wariness of cooperatives has continued beyond the era of the Derg regime when cooperatives were used 
to extend strong government control to the local level and promote socialist ideology through compulsory 
participation. The above results could therefore be driven by a slow process of trust recovery in these 
organizations. Having said this, it can also be argued that the commercialization indicator captures the 
total amount of cereals sold by the farmers, and is not restricted to sales through the cooperative.  
Moreover, since the median age of the cooperatives in this sample is more than seven years old, it is 
likely that members would have had sufficient time to update their perceptions and expectations of their 
cooperatives in light of the present government’s strategies. 
  A more likely explanation may lie in the heterogeneous impact of cooperatives across 
households, driven by different behavioral responses to these higher prices. Specifically, some households 
may choose to sell less and retain more for their own consumption because they can earn enough money 
by selling only some of their crop at the new, higher price. The next section proposes a first investigation 
towards such mechanism. 25 
7.  HETEROGENEOUS IMPACT OF COOPERATIVES 
The results presented in Table 10 are averages and as such do not capture the heterogeneity of impact 
across households. There is, however, no reason to assume without investigation that membership in a 
cooperative will produce homogenous responses for different categories of farmers. To test this, we plot 
in Figure 3 the density distributions of cooperatives’ impact on members’ percentage production sold 
(upper graph) and on output prices (lower graph).
22,23 
  As expected, the figure shows great heterogeneity in members’ response. Some cooperative 
members’ share of production sold (PS) is almost double the level of their non-member counterparts. 
However, for many other members, their share of production sold is significantly lower than their non-
member counterparts, presumably because of the higher prices within the cooperative. 
  The low price elasticity of farmers’ supply in poor countries has been widely studied over the past 
two decades. In particular, it has been shown that transaction costs may lead to such low prices for 
farmers that households are better off being self-sufficient than participating in markets. In other cases, 
households may not be able to seize market opportunities due to low asset endowments, credit constraints, 
or price risk-aversion. The latter may be particularly important for very poor households for whom food 
insecurity and price risk may lead to a preference for food self-sufficiency (see de Janvry and Sadoulet 
(2003) for an in-depth review).
24 As a result, exogenous price increases, unless sufficiently high, may not 
result in greater market participation among small farmers.  
  Our results show, however, that some farmers tend to decrease their marketed surplus as a result 
of the price increase secured by the cooperative. Given that we looked only at staple crops, this 
phenomenon may be explained by comparing the effect of the price increase on the household’s 
production behaviour and its consumption behaviour. While a price increase will probably lead to a 
positive production response, if anything, its effect on consumption is ambiguous, so the overall impact 
on market surplus is unclear. This impact may be particularly unpredictable for poorer households who 
                                                 
22 Let PS measure the household’s share of production sold and    PS  the share of production sold by its generated 
counterfactual, the curves in the upper graph represent the distribution of PS-   PS . Similarly, the distribution of PD-   PD  is 
represented in the lower graph. 
23 We note that the two matching techniques employed are relatively close to each other in their assessment of the individual 
impact. 
24 Farm households in developing economies tend to be risk-averse, and the poorer ones more so (Antle 1987; Barrett 1993; 
Ellis 1993; Fafchamps 1999; Kurosaki and Fafchamps 2002; Morduch 1990, 1995; Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993; Saha 1994). Some evidence to that effect has also been obtained in relation to Ethiopian farm 
households (Cummins 1999; Kebede, Gunjal, and Coffin 1990; Belete, Dillon, and Anderson (1993)). In particular, using 
experimental data collected from a sample of farmers, Cummins (1999) concludes that most farmers are risk averse and that the 
degree of risk aversion falls as wealth increases. 26 
cannot necessarily produce more if they want to and whose consumption of cereals is more closely related 
to their income.
25 
Figure 3.  Distribution of cooperative membership impact across households 
Kernel-density estimates: (Y axis measures the density of households, X axis measures the impact of 
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  A simple way to see this is to consider both the facts that (i) the vast majority of rural households 
in Ethiopia are not fully self-sufficient and do need cash as they need to fulfil minimum liquidity needs 
(for consumption, production, or tax purposes), and that ; (ii) poorer farm households typically face food 
shortage.
26 As a result, when facing a price increase allowing them to cover their liquidity needs with a 
lower quantity of output, poorer farmers will reduce the fraction of output marketed and increase that 
                                                 
25 Evidence suggests that the preference for food self-sufficiency falls as income/wealth rises in Ethiopia (Taffesse Bernard 
and Yu 2007).  
26 In 2006, the Ethiopian government deemed 8.3 million of its people to be chronically food insecure. Moreover, the 2004 
Ethiopian Welfare Monitoring Survey, shows that 47 percent of children under five in Ethiopia have stunted growth. 
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consumed. In contrast, for larger farmers who already are able to fully cover their consumption needs, an 
increase in price should lead to an increase marketed surplus. 
  Overall, when farmers can sell their staple crops such as cereals at a higher price than before, the 
smallest farmers may substitute out of the market (sell less and consume more), whereas the larger ones 
will tend to supply more. We test these predictions in Table 11 below, where we investigate household-
level correlates of cooperative impact on both output price and the share of output sold. The first two 
columns report Ordinary Least Square estimates of the impact of membership on output prices. Columns 
3 and 4 report Tobit estimates of the impact of cooperatives on the household’s share of cereals 
production sold – households without any production sold in 2005 are considered censored observations. 
  Importantly, the above hypothesis predicts that households with a relatively low level of 
production before joining the cooperative will tend to supply less on the market than their non-member 
counterparts. This means that using actual production levels to differentiate between smaller and larger 
farmers may be misleading, because production levels may themselves respond to price incentives. 
Instead we use the number of hectares of land “owned” by the household as a proxy for its actual level of 
production. Given the land ownership regime in Ethiopia (explained in Section 3), this variable is 
considered to be exogenous, at least in the short or medium term. Other variables included in the estimate 
include the household head’s level of literacy, household size, and a set of kebele-level control variables 
used in the definition of the development domains. 
  Columns 1 and 3 report simple average estimates of the cooperative’s impact. Coefficients in the 
upper part of the table indicate, as expected, that households with more education and who live close to 
markets sell more of their production and at higher prices. Larger households, however, tend to sell less of 
their output. Interestingly, favorable agro-climatic conditions (meaning surplus-producing areas) tend to 
have depressing effects on prices and positive effects on households’ marketed surplus. Finally, the 
amount of land owned does not seem to have any effect on the output price received by the household, 
although each additional hectare owned does lead to a higher sales proportion. In the middle part of Table 
11, we show the coefficients on a membership dummy. As expected from the estimates in Section 6, 
cooperative membership does have a significant positive impact on output price, although there is no 
significant effect on the share of production sold. 
  In Columns 2 and 4, we further refine the analysis by interacting the membership dummy with 
household- and kebele-level variables. None of the coefficients obtained for the price regression differs 
significantly from zero, indicating that no obvious discrimination exists between members regarding the 
output price. In Column 4, however, we find that the effect of membership on the share of production sold 
increases with the size of the landholding. Furthermore, as indicated by the model’s negative constant, the 28 
impact of membership on the proportion of crop sold is negative for the smallest farmers while positive 
for the larger ones. 
Table 11.  Heterogeneous effects of membership on commercialization 
  Price difference  % Production sold 
 OLS  Tobit   
 1  2  3  4 
Land owned (ha)  0.134  -0.070  4.147  3.651 
 (0.833)  (0.874)  (0.679)***  (0.709)*** 
Household head literate  4.322  4.387  3.758  3.929 
 (2.172)**  (2.267)*  (1.779)**  (1.851)** 
Household  size  0.058 0.201  -0.992 -0.936 
 (0.499)  (0.518)  (0.384)***  (0.395)** 
Market access  7.223  6.631 4.199 4.245 
 (2.293)***  (2.336)***  (1.806)**  (1.830)** 
Population density  -5.443  -4.093  -6.555  -6.089 
 (3.365)  (3.577)  (2.559)**  (2.724)** 
Agricultural potential  -25.164  -26.947  12.030  10.600 
 (4.239)***  (4.330)***  (3.098)***  (3.162)*** 
Treatment 12.296  -28.237  0.919  -20.242 
 (3.893)***  (27.696)  (3.183)  (20.675) 
Treatment x …         
Land owned (ha)    2.383    5.574 
   (3.037)    (2.449)*** 
Household head literate    3.709    0.253 
   (8.409)    (6.708) 
Household size    -2.481    -1.173 
   (2.031)    (1.578) 
Market access    7.591    -8.385 
   (14.724)    (11.650) 
Population density    -10.738    -0.401 
   (10.665)    (7.949) 
Agricultural potential    44.080    25.166 
   (22.452)**    (15.389) 
Constant  12.333 17.527  -16.477 -14.867 
 (11.678)  (15.991)  (3.765)***  (3.842)*** 
# Observations  854  854  1800  1800 
      (927 obs censored at %=0) 
Notes:  Reported are coefficients for both OLS and Tobit estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signif. at 10%. ** 
Signif. at 5%. *** Signif. at 1%. 
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8.  CONCLUSION 
During the past decade, Ethiopia’s policy has been to promote smallholder farmer marketing cooperatives 
as a way not only to increase the commercialization of smallholder agriculture, but also to ensure that 
farmers enhance their livelihoods from market participation. With the benefit of a rich, nationally 
representative data set collected from a sample of nearly 7,200 rural Ethiopian households, this paper has 
advanced the understanding of the impact of this policy thrust at a number of levels. 
  First, we have traced the institutional progression and context as well as the spread of 
cooperatives across regions and types of households. Our key findings at this level are that, despite the 
spread of cooperatives from 15 percent to 35 percent of districts in the country, only 9 percent of 
Ethiopian rural households are members. We find that the cooperatives formed tend to be located in 
places with better market access and lower exposure to environmental and price risks. We also find that, 
on average, cooperative members are better educated and farm more land. 
  Second, at the methodological level, in the effort to analyze the impact of cooperatives in 
Ethiopia, this study has identified and elaborated the potential self-selection biases that emerge from 
simple comparisons of members with non-members. These biases have to do with attributes of the areas 
(kebeles) in which cooperatives are located, as well as the attributes of the households themselves. Thus, 
the paper has shown how one might use the propensity-matching method to evaluate the impact of 
cooperatives. A key feature of the Ethiopian context that enables such a methodology to be relevant is the 
fact that cooperative establishment is not endogenous to the members themselves but is largely 
exogenous, in the sense that it is part of a national, and therefore externally driven, plan to spread 
cooperatives in rural areas. Thus, using our household survey data to confirm where cooperatives are 
created at the members’ initiative versus where they are established by external actors, we select the sub-
sample of the latter type of cooperatives to conduct a rigorous two-step matching. The matching was 
undertaken between kebeles with and without cooperatives, according to specific kebele characteristics. It 
was then undertaken between households that are members of cooperatives and similar households in 
similar kebeles that do not have cooperatives. This careful selection and matching process ensures a 
relatively unbiased estimate of the true impacts of cooperatives on household commercialization 
behavior. 
  At the third level, that of the impact analysis itself, we evaluate impact on two possible outcomes: 
the extent of market participation (share of production sold on the market), and the prices obtained in the 
market. The results are somewhat sobering in that, looking at the aggregate of the households in the 
sample, cooperative membership has no impact on average, on the decision of how much to sell for those 30 
who do participate. The only impact is that cooperative members can sell their produce at higher prices 
than non-members. 
  Finally, at a fourth level, we go beyond the aggregate analysis of impact to evaluate the 
distribution of the impact of membership across households individually. This evaluation suggests that 
the impact of cooperative membership is heterogeneous, in that different households benefit differently 
from membership. In particular, we found that smaller farmers tend to sell less of their marketable surplus 
as a result of higher prices, while larger farmers sell more. 
  Importantly, because of data constraints, the cooperative’s impact was only computed for cereal 
crops. Although cereals account for most agricultural output, this is nonetheless an important caveat in 
that the results on cooperatives’ impact may not necessarily be a good approximation of the impact of 
cooperatives involved in the marketing of cash crops or perishable crops such as coffee, dairy products, or 
khat. Moreover, the fact that cooperatives have a limited impact on their members’ commercialization 
does not prevent them from offering other types of benefits. Indeed, cooperatives and farmers’ 
organizations in general are also social organizations, and can therefore affect their members in other 
ways, not just commercialization. 
  These findings have significant policy implications. First, they show that cooperatives are 
effective at providing marketing services to their members: the positive and significant impact of 
membership on price reveals that cooperatives do serve their expected purpose on commercialization 
through better market opportunities, higher bargaining power, or reduced transaction costs. 
  Second, these results, when combined with lower cooperative membership rates among smaller 
farmers, suggest that cooperatives alone may not be sufficient to effectively promote smallholder 
commercialization. If it is true that commercialization enhances productivity and income in the long run, 
complementary institutions need to be designed to address the specific needs of the smallest farmers. 
  Finally, beyond location and household profile, there are particular characteristics of cooperatives 
themselves that may constrain their capacity to affect their members’ commercialization. This latter issue, 
on the determinants of cooperative performance, is the subject of a forthcoming companion paper. 31 
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